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INTERVIEW WITH DALE BERTSCH 
BY J. WATRAS 
JULY 29, 1994 
DB: ... during the summer of 1970 and I talked to the 
mayor's managers in Montgomery county. I basically said that 
those communities that would not adopt the plan and implement it 
that we would use A95 review as a vehicle for including the 
distribution of federal funds to their communities. 
JW: So if they didn't go along with the dispersal of the 
low income housings, then you did have some kind of a stick with 
which you coul d ••. 
DB: ... the 95 review process. If you go back ... 
JW: The 95 review refers to ... 
DB: That's a review mechanism that the Regional Planning 
Commission has to review all federal funds. And we had a grading 
sheet that we used to make judgements about whether or not there 
was planned compliance and historically regional planning 
commissions across the country, if a community is applying for 
transportation money they merely require that the community's 
transportation plan reflect what I call the "regional ethic" 
rather than plan. The difference is that Miami Valley we 
required that communities in applying for transportation money 
have acted affirmatively on the bundle of plans; not only 
transportation, but open space, housing, etc., all of the various 
elements of the plan. So communities were being judged in terms 
of their compliance with this entire package of things. My 
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argument consistently was that a community shouldn't be allowed 
to belly up to the food trough of the federal government and 
selectively decide what they're going to eat. They either eat 
from the whole trough, everything that's there, or they don't get 
fed. 
JW: So that would mean that they would have to support low 
income housing or incorporate it in some fashion before they 
could have transportation, etc. 
DB: That's right. And there were a number of communities 
that did not like that and put us on notice that they were going 
to drop out of the Regional Planning commission. West Carrollton 
did, Darke County did, Miami County did, and they were out for a 
very short period of time. We stopped the flow of federal 
dollars into those areas and they rejoined the Regional Planning 
commission very quickly. 
JW: It always seemed odd to me that you could get 
compliance to something as controversial as low income dispersal. 
DB: But it was coalition. Not only that, I argued that it 
was right. 
JW: Morally right. 
DB: That's right. There was a lot of use of, some people 
would argue misuse of perceived power in trying to create that 
coalition. The city of Centerville or village at that time, 
rejected the first project that was proposed in their community, 
a project that's called Chevy Chase. 
JW: Which is there now. 
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DB: It's there now. The mayor, a guy by the name of Paul 
Hoy, agreed with me privately that he would support it and he 
agreed with the Area Progress Council that he would support it. 
There were a whole group of folks in the Area Progress council -
you're familiar with the Area Progress Council? 
JW: Hmm, hmm. 
DB: ... that met with Paul Hoy on that project because I 
wanted to have the first project built as a result of that plan 
in the town I lived in. And I lived in centerville. When it 
came time for the project, we had the votes. It was 4-3 in favor 
of the plan. Paul Hoy reversed himself on the vote and came down 
3-3 and he voted against the plan. I went home and called Jim 
stewart, who was the president and chairman of the board of 
Dayton Power and Light and suggested to Jim, who Paul Hoy worked 
for, that he had an employee that was not following the party 
line according to APC from a committee that Jim stewart chaired. 
And he said, "Well what can I do about it?" And I said, "I don't 
know, but I would think you would be able to do something. And 
the next meeting Paul Hoy brought the issue up, being a 
descending member he could do it, according to parliamentary 
procedure, and it passed 4-3. Paul Hoy resigned the mayorship 
right after that. I know what went on. So there was power 
structure support for the plan and they used that support in 
order to bring about certain amounts of compliance. Oakwood had 
a very difficult time because they had very few sites in Oakwood. 
But they met compliance in kind of a different way. 
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JW: Yeah, how did they do that? 
DB: By providing other kind of resources that supported the 
plan. 
JW: For example ... ? 
DB: Money. And moral leadership. 
JW: In the newspaper articles I don't get a feeling of 
Oakwood providing moral leadership; I do get a feeling of 
citizens resisting low income housing in their area. Acting city 
meetings. 
DB: All that's true. The citizens were very much against 
it, but the mayor of Oakwood, Bonnie McCauley, who was on counsel 
and MVRPC representative, Dave Fell and Mike Kelly, who is now I 
guess the police chief or services chief in Oakwood, they all 
worked very hard to develop compliance within their means. In 
doing it they couldn't just turn their back on their citizenry, 
so the implications certainly ... there was a lot of work behind 
the scenes that was done in order to make it work. 
JW: What was the nature of the resistance? Is it simply 
race? 
DB: Race. 
JW: It is race and class antagonism? 
DB: Yes, I think it's racism to a great extent. I think of 
a lot of it is ignorance. My philosophy always has been on real 
controversial issues that about 10% of the people in the 
community are going to support something simply because if you 
can demonstrate that there's a certain amount of morality 
4 
involved in it, there's going to be support for it. All you got 
to do is send the word out and people will support it. There's 
about 15% of the people, 15 or 20% of the people who are going to 
oppose any kind of change simply because it's change. It's that 
other group of people that you need to deal with from an 
informational standpoint. Did you ever see the slide talk or 
dialogue that went with the slide talk? 
JW: No, all I have is what was in the archives from Wright 
state University. 
DB: That's the address before the Montgomery County 
Commission. I've reached in here and looked for it and looked 
for it, couldn't find it and all of a sudden I open the thing up 
and here it is. But I think that's fairly clear in terms 
of ... Here's a piece ... I used to go up to the University of 
Wisconsin and talk periodically and that's something that he 
wrote about strategy - "The Planner as strategist" - which I 
think has a certain amount of relevancy. This is the narrative 
for the slide presentation that we used which was written by Ann 
Shaeffer, who is still at MVRPC. But that sets the tone. When 
we decided to go ahead with the fair share housing plan, and it 
was kind of hatched at a retreat, up in Darke County, we were 
trying to figure out what to do and there hadn't been such a plan 
anywhere in the nation. 
JW: You were the first. 
DB: Yeah. See that? I got that national award first being 
fair share housing plan. And it's also the basis for the 
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Rockefeller Award that I got, which made Ohio state possible. My 
idea was that there is this gap of folks, maybe as many as 70% 
that are not strongly supportive of change because they don't 
understand what change means. The assumption was that fair share 
housing plan was going to be ... fair share was a term that's used 
nationally now; the term fair share was developed by the New York 
Times in the article that they wrote after the adoption of the 
plan. And it was ingrained in the literature and in law by the 
Mount Laurel case, which I was involved in in New Jersey, which 
developed state laws implementing fair share housing plans. But 
my feeling was that we somehow had to provide an educational 
forum for that 70%. So I wanted to be able to have a slide 
presentation and it was a very fancy thing, double projectors 
flashing on and off, that basically let people know who were the 
people who were affected by this plan. The assumption by many 
people was that we had just busloads of minorities in the city of 
Dayton that were going to be tromping out to the suburbs. And 
most of them were female head of households with lots of kids. 
In reality, the majority of people who need housing are whites. 
They're people who pick up your garbage, they're the people in 
some cases who teach your children. Phil Donahue's first 
national show was the fair share housing plan. And the point 
that Phil was making in his show, that first show, which was a 
very controversial show, was that in the city of Centerville 
teachers couldn't afford to live in the community. People who 
you entrusted your children to, 8 or 6 hours a day, can't live 
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within the community unless they're in the administrative way of 
line somewhere. The policemen that enforce the laws in the 
community couldn't afford afford to live in the town. And right 
on down the line. There was a guy by the name of McIntyre who 
was a councilperson in Centerville who was violently opposed to 
the plan and in fact really took on Chuck Whalen when Chuck 
Whalen was in Congress and Whalen was a strong supporter of the 
plan. And it was kind of interesting because when Chevy Chase 
opened up, one of the first five applicants was McIntyre's 
mother, which I made a big deal of. People don't understand who 
are the affected parties. They assume they are welfare 
recipients. I had this little thing that I used to pullout all 
the time that tried to paint a picture of who are the people who 
are affected, the so-called low income people. They end up being 
white, the majority are people who work all their lives and are 
now on fixed income. Many of them are people who are sick. 
Death occurs and suddenly these people find themselves not being 
able to afford housing. Our firm right now is building the first 
low income housing on Hilton Head, South Carolina. Everyone of 
the people who are occupying our units are people who have fairly 
decent jobs on Hilton Head. But because of the small market for 
housing at that level they are having to drive 90 miles to and 
from the mainland every day to their jobs. There were a lot of 
people who worked at the Dayton Airport who could not live in 
Vandalia. They were having to drive from the center city from 
Dayton to Vandalia every day and use up some of their disposable 
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income in transportation costs, whereas if they could live in 
Vandalia they had the ability of being And not only 
that, but I felt very deeply about it just being a just cause. 
JW: So even if it did involve the welfare mother with the 
large number of children, that would still be a reasonable place 
for them to live. 
DB: Sure. And the questions that we always asked were - I 
mean there were a number of studies that were done, we didn't do 
the plan and go on to something else. 
JW: No. 
DB: There was the plan, there was a study that was called 
"The Needs Beyond Housing" and the study that was done on the 
needs beyond housing looked at the kinds of things that were not 
available in the suburbs, that these people who would be the 
occupants, would need to have access to. When we developed the 
fair share housing plan, there were people who were saying, "We 
can't put poor people in the suburbs because we don't distribute 
food stamps out here." I said, "You're damn right you don't. And 
you've got to start distributing food stamps." "We don't have 
day care centers for these people; we don't have jobs for these 
people." "You're right. You need to develop those." So there 
were a lot of people who basically said here's a big circle and 
you've got housing, you've got jobs, you've got support services, 
and a whole bunch of other kinds of things. And city managers 
and mayors and people in general were saying, "Look, until we get 
these, we really can't provide this because we are going to be 
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hurting these people." And I said, "It's a catch-22 because 
these people can't afford to get to the jobs in the suburbs. 
Secondly, the support services aren't going to corne unless you 
can show a need." They said, "We don't need the support 
services; we haven't got anybody out here that needs them." One 
of them certainly is this, too - Access to Education ... 
JW: Integrated schooling is the argument against busing. 
DB: And so we were saying basically look, rather than wait 
until this circle is complete and then fill in the last item, 
which would be housing, we're going to put the housing there and 
then the needs are going to present and you're going to have to 
provide the other stuff. And that's exactly what has happened. 
One of the major problems with this whole thing that has occurred 
that has made the fair share concept questionable in terms of 
working, was one big thing that changed. Nixon in his second 
term moved away from discretionary grants and moved toward the 
block grants. As long as we were dealing with discretionary 
grants, we were positioned to be able to negotiate with 
communities. We could go to Greene County, which we did, and 
say, "Look, you want a park? You want a recreation facility? 
You want some swimming pools in Fairborn and in Xenia? You get 
some housing in Xenia, you get some housing in Fairborn, we'll 
see to it that you get parks and playgrounds and swimming pools." 
And they'd say, "Fine," and they'd sign on the line and we'd 
deliver the grants. HUD was there with money galore throwing it 
at us. But when you have the money going directly to the 
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community and allow them not to have to meet any of these 
requirements, then it's no longer discretionary, you lose your 
leverage, and not only that, they created section 8 housing, 
which to a great extent, not that you're scattering the people, 
but you have no way of knowing where they're at and you have no 
way of knowing whether or not it's fulfilling the other kind of 
social obligations of the community. We basically wanted to cut 
that circle and get people there. I also viewed it very 
seriously that communities were not going to be integrated, 
including schools, jobs were not going to be made available until 
you change housing patterns. To me, the housing pattern is the 
bottom line. You can have diversity, which I look as a very 
positive thing, you can have diversity within a community if you 
can have people living within the community. I think they're 
being short-changed by busing because 1) they spend a lot of time 
on the bus, and secondly, they lose access to the other rich 
components of the community and communities differ. 
JW: One of the arguments that the lawyers in the case for 
the desegregation of the Dayton Schools made, was that the 
federal government had caused the segregated housing patterns and 
look at FHA, mortgage insurance •.. 
DB: And it goes beyond that - the interstate system, when 
the Eisenhower administration developed the interstate system, 
what they allowed was people to get out of the community faster. 
The only thing that was holding people into the center city was 
access to jobs and having to take a long time getting to and from 
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the suburbs. By building these superhighways, carving up the 
central cities, destroying neighborhoods, disecting viable 
communities, they in essence made it easier for those of means to 
go out to the suburbs and still have access within a reasonable 
timeframe to their jobs. That's certainly true in major 
metropolitan areas. So the highway program, the water and sewer 
grant system was very biased. Under all of the water and sewer 
grant systems, as long as the federal government was involved in 
it, they would pay 80% of new construction for water and sewer 
systems. They paid zero for the maintenance of, or the 
enlargement, of center city systems. So the infrastructure was 
falling apart on the center city and cornfields were being 
provided 80% subsidy for water and sewer systems. So every 
federal program, practically, subsidized the whole concept of 
suburbanization and de-peopling of major central cities. A lot 
of studies have been done on that. There's all kind of studies 
about the impact of federalism during the post-war period, post-
World War II period, up to even today it's occurred. It's a lot 
easier to expand the water and sewer treatment plant, build a new 
highway, build a new water and sewer system, than it is to try to 
expand in the central city. There's no question about it. And 
not only that, but allowing suburban systems to have access now, 
school systems in Ohio, to the income tax. It just further 
exacerbates the problem because you're making it even easier for 
them to finance these separate schools. Until the school system, 
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finance system, changes that creates a problem, too. Somebody 
you really need to talk to if you haven't is Jim Kunde. 
JW: Yes. Everyone tells me I've got to talk to him. 
DB: He's over in Indianapolis now. In fact, he does some 
work with our firm. I've just finished a job with him. If you 
need his telephone number ... 
JW: Yes, I do. We can do that in a minute. 
DB: 317-261-3032. If you can't get him at work, his home 
phone is 317-684-8047. He's the director of the Coalition to 
Improve Management in state and Local Government, School of 
Public and Environmental Affairs, Indiana University, 
Indianapolis. It's a combination between the University of 
Indiana and Purdue. There was a just a very unique chemistry of 
people in Dayton at that time that made everything possible. You 
had city manager, ... 
JW: Which was Mr. Kunde? 
DB: Well Kunde really came after Fair Share. 
JW: Watts was the ... 
DB: Right. Graham Watt. Not with an S. I'm not sure 
where Graham was on the fair share housing. He was just kind of 
hands-off. He was looking elsewhere and trying to move up and 
did. So the majority of the fair share housing stuff was kind of 
done in the transition between Graham Watt and Jim Kunde. Kunde 
embraced it fully when he came in. Because it fit his ethic. We 
stayed associated while he was in Kansas City. Jeff Carroll, who 
was head of Metropolitan Studies was there. Eichelberger, who 
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was chief of police, was very supportive. Both heads of the 
Democratic and Republican parties were very supportive. 
JW: Would it be fair to say that the attitude of ... 
DB: Jim Fain, editor of the Dayton Daily News was by far, 
without the media support, if we had had a negative media, they 
would have just tore us apart. 
JW: Media attacked your opposition. 
DB: Oh, yeah. 
JW: The stories are very well-written. 
DB: The fame was just great. The cartoonist, Mike Peters 
and his cartoons ... The Journal Herald was very supportive of it 
also, but Glen Thompson tended to have a little different agenda. 
He tended to be ... he was pro-regional planning. But Glen really 
didn't get that deeply involved in the fair share housing stuff. 
But he was supportive. 
JW: Is it fair to say that .. 
DB: David Rike was just ... the funding for projects ... we had 
a blank check from David Rike. When we built the project in 
Fairborn, David Rike wrote me personally a $17,000 check to 
underwrite that project and I told him that if the project 
doesn't go through, you might not get this back. And he said, 
"I'm not worried about that." But it goes to me and I put the 
money up, he didn't want to have that high visibility but he was 
behind the scenes writing checks. 
JW: He seems to have done that a lot. He supported the 
Center City School at Christ Episcopal Church. 
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DB: That's correct. Sheer. Another APA person. Jim 
stewart, clearly. I could just go down a whole list of folks 
that was just a coalition of .. what's his name ... school 
superintendent ... 
JW: Wayne Carle. 
DB: Wayne Carle was strongly supportive. We had a group of 
about 10 or 12 people who used to have breakfast once or twice a 
month and we would say what are the hot issues and how could we 
help each other on our agendas. When the NAACP was looking for 
resources to file their suit against the Columbus Schools, I had 
some loose money within the MVRPC budget. We provided secretarial 
support, reproduction facilities, and strategy sessions in our 
conference room. My own board didn't know that. And we didn't 
let it out. But it was part of the team effort. The school 
desegregation suit helped us. We helped them. 
JW: They originally wanted to move into a metropolitan 
fashion; that is, they wanted to incorporate all of the districts 
around Dayton into some larger desegregation plan. 
DB: We had a general agreement, and I'll be awful careful 
how you use this; we had a general agreement from the judge, the 
federal judge, that he would probably come down with the 
metropolitan funding. At the last minute, he backed off. 
JW: The view that the lawyers give, there's one lawyer in 
particular who wrote a book about that case, and he paints Judge 
Rubin as extremely conservative and unreceptive. 
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DB: Well, when he met with the six of us, he was clearly 
feeling that we were very concerned of what it would do to the 
city of Dayton, per say, and as it turned out, it did. It was an 
economic nightmare. And they haven't recovered yet. The only 
thing that it saved the desegregation in the city of Columbus, 
and I follow that very carefully; in fact, I have a student every 
year that updates a study on the desegregation in Columbus. The 
judge, Bob Duncan and I, are very close. In fact, he's an 
attorney now for the university. But the only thing that saves 
the city of Columbus is that the city of Columbus has about 11 or 
12 school districts that serve the city of Columbus and their 
extensive annexation pattern. 
JW: Am I understanding that desegregation didn't go beyond 
the Columbus school district so that other ones won't ... 
DB: They are affected. If you take a look at the Columbus 
school system itself it mimics every other central city school 
system in this country. 
JW: Although the city itself has expanded, but the district 
itself is segregated. 
DB: But you've got all these free school systems now. And 
the Win-win Agreement over here has only exacerbated it because 
it's reduced the amounts of building permits on residences 
terrifically. My involvement in the whole school issue goes back 
to when I was in Arkansas in the 1950's. I was asked by the 
University of Arkansas, where I was employed, and senator 
Fulbright kind of monitored, who I also did work for, to monitor 
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the Little Rock school situation. One of the big mistakes that 
was made very early in that game was to integrate the high school 
rather than start the integration, and this is my opinion, rather 
than ... 
SIDE TWO 
DB: ... had integration begun to occur, say the first five 
years of school, and then let that class system move on through 
the system, I think a lot of blood, sweat and tears would have 
been avoided. The South was unique in integration in that 
communities were integrated. You had whites living next to 
blacks. You had poor people living next to rich people in the 
South, in all their neighborhoods. And all they did was call 
folks out and send them to different schools. Well, the minute 
that integration began to occur, there was a natural mixing that 
occurred in the South that never occurred here because our 
segregation in the North was housing patterns moreso than 
schools. The private school syndrome has hit the South, where 
it's a different kind of thing. They are still segregated but 
it's through private schools now. 
JW: But that would be why you looked at housing patterns as 
being so central in the northern cities. And that was your 
concern at the time was, of course, the northern city of Dayton. 
DB: Not only Dayton, the Miami Valley, the counties because 
we felt, both as a staff and as a commission, that it was 
imperative to change housing patterns in order to maintain good 
planning standards. Good planning standards call for 
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neighborhood development. And there isn't anything worse in 
destroying a neighborhood than, in essence, picking children up 
out of the neighborhood and shipping them allover. 
JW: You mentioned before that it was the block grant system 
that ended the hope for a dispersal plan. But after Nixon pushed 
for his block grant system and after Congress accepted it, I 
believe HUD gave you some extra money; 2.8 million, or something 
like that. 
DB: Oh, yeah. We had lots of money. 
JW: So you had hoped that with that you could ... 
DB: At the advice of Romney, before Romney left he cut a 
deal with us where we had all the money we needed to run it with 
our plan. He was really interested in promoting it; he was 
interested in the bigger city solutions on a metropolitan level. 
When Jim Lynn came in, as the secretary after Romney, and when -
I can't remember what her name was - the other secretary at HUD, 
they created a moratorium, they slowed construction, other than 
in our area. We continued to get money. But I argued that, and 
this is why I visited, Romney sent me on a tour across the 
country and for a year and a half I visited virtually every 
metropolitan area in this country. Maybe there were a half a 
dozen I didn't. They basically bought my time for me going on 
the road for him, promoting this metropolitan concept. And 
unless it was going to be done nationally, and that was one of 
the requirements when I went to Washington after we did it, 
unless it became a national priority, it wasn't going to work in 
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Dayton. If, in essence, Dayton had a fully dispersed, fully 
integrated, metropolitan area, if somebody didn't want that, they 
could go to Cleveland, they could come to Columbus. 
JW: Or you'd have white flight on an inner city level. 
DB: ... or on an inner state level. If Ohio did it, Jack 
Gilligan loved the concept. And he tried to implement it within 
our RPDO system. And it ended up getting him defeated. 
JW: What is RPDO? 
DB: Regional Planning and Development Organizations. And 
one of the requirements was that you have the fair share housing. 
Len Ashley, who was congressman from Toledo and majority member 
on the House Banking Currency Committee, put it into legislation. 
The urban policy, the You-Dag grants, the whole Carter urban 
policy began to attach fair share housing as a component to it. 
The concept of expected to reside began to find its way into the 
block grant program. Once we realized that we had to play with 
block grants, then what we tried to do was affect how the block 
grants were distributed. So we had that little component added 
into the block grants during the Carter administration that dealt 
with expected to reside. And expected to reside basically said 
you had to plan for housing, not only for your own constituency, 
but you had to plan for those who wanted to live in your 
community, or who might want to live in your community. So that 
there was a choice being provided. That's still a part of the 
law, but it's gotten very soft during 12 years of Reagan and 
Bush. There's a new planning piece of legislation that just 
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passed. HUD is just beginning to promote it now, which was 
developed during the transition period, the Clinton transition 
period. And it basically is going to be promoting once again 
fair share housing. Not with those terms; old timers are still 
using that term, but it's not in the legislation that way. But 
the concept is there. More and more courts are requiring it. 
Courts in Massachusetts have established it; courts in Virginia 
have established it; New Jersey have established it; New York, 
Pennsylvania. 
JW: Have established it for what end? 
DB: Basically that communities cannot prohibit subsidized 
family housing; they can't prohibit ... it used to be that the FHA 
director and municipalities could pass legislation not to have 
subsidized housing. They no longer can do that. 
JW: Now that would be state by state and it would be state 
law, rather than federal law? 
DB: It was their federal precedent, too. In Massachusetts 
it is state and in the case of New Jersey, if you would go back 
and look at the 3 Mount Laurel cases, and there's going to be a 
fourth Mount Laurel that I'm working with the state of New Jersey 
on right now in the federal courts. It's getting ready to pop. 
So I think the concept is still valid. I think the net result is 
that we 10st ... I think the Kurner commission, when it was 
written, was right. I think we are a more segregated society 
today. I think there's a bigger separation today between haves 
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and have nots. But what we've lost is two more generations. I'm 
still a flag waving advocate of the concept. 
JW: Joe Wine used to say that it was really very easy to 
disperse, in fact the statement that fascinated me was that he 
said it was extremely easy to disperse low income or low income 
housing; all you would have to do is require that in order to get 
FHA mortgage insurance a community would have to have a certain 
fair share. 
DB: Yeah, well see that's what Romney had in mind. The 
biggest person, antagonist in that regard, was an FHA director 
out of Cincinnati. And he was really creating some problems for 
us. 
JW: You mentioned in one of your speeches that you gave in 
New York City, I think in 1972, that you were having trouble with 
local FHA authorities, although you complimented HUD officials. 
DB: Yeah. And as it turned out in a meeting with Romney 
and Van Dusen, who was the secretary under Romney, they asked me 
what would help our program. And I outlined money, I outlined 
advocating the concept nationally, hanging it as a requirement on 
HUD money for planning. We took the money away from the Detroit 
metropolitan region. We took the money away from Cincinnati. We 
took the money away from Pittsburgh. We took the money away from 
Los Angeles because they failed to address the housing issue. 
You're talking about big chunks of money that funded two thirds 
of the planning programs for the region. The other thing that I 
asked was is that they fire the FHA director in cincinnati and 
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give us that power. That was a little more difficult to do, but 
they did it. They did it and the FHA director brought a civil 
rights action against HUD and said it was a wrongful interference 
in his job. Thank goodness I was never subpoenaed to court. I'm 
not sure what I would have done. But we got rid of him. The FHA 
director called me and he called Ann Schaeffer and he tried to 
get us to write affadavits supporting that he was merely carrying 
out his law. And Ann and I both basically said that we don't 
know anything about it; we don't want to get involved. But we 
were glad to get rid of him. 
JW: Yes, I can imagine. You mentioned that critical mass 
of important support that you had in Dayton; is there any 
explanations as to why that occurred? Or would you just say that 
was one of the fortunate circumstances? I'm thinking of the 
riot; that that may have had some effort or some effect to change 
people. 
DB: When I laid the work program out in 1964, as the first 
planning director, I set about the strategy of trying to develop 
a certain amount of dependency on data and information. And I 
tried to find out what the most important things were in peoples' 
perceptions. And they felt that open space and transportation 
and things like that were important. So we decided that we would 
proceed to do that first. And we put housing down the road and 
felt that we would begin to deal with housing about 1972. with 
the advent of the riots, there was an attitude survey of the 
black community. The number one complaint that they had was 
housing. And we decided to jump start our housing program based 
on the results of that interview after the riot. So we jump 
started it two or three years earlier and the net result was 
that ... so the riot did have something to do with it. 
JW: One aspect of the riots were of course the Model cities 
program, or one effect of them, seems to have been the Model 
Cities program. And the Model Cities program had a satellite 
corporation which dealt exclusively with housing. Did they 
conflict with your dispersal plan? 
DB: No. In fact, if you read that article there in City 
Magazine, C.J. McLin is quoted as saying that he fully supports 
the plan and he would hope that his constituents would not pack 
up and leave west Dayton. But he certainly hoped that they would 
have the opportunity should they want to. So I think it was a 
case of opportunity. We counseled with the NAACP and the black 
community on an on-going basis. In fact, when the first 
application of the Model cities application was submitted to City 
Council, it was also submitted to MVRPC because we were required 
to perform a review of the Model Cities application. We denied 
the application because we didn't feel as though there was 
sufficient citizen participation. 
JW: Dh that was the Scholar Plan, the planning proposal. 
DB: That's right. And Jim McGee I thought was going to 
have a fit. We sat down and talked about it and he asked Graham 
Watt and all of us to help design a better grant. And Jeff Piro 
in our office worked with the central city. And the net result 
was that Jim McGee gave me the key to the city of Dayton for 
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helping them get that one of the initial grants. And when Graham 
Watt left and Kunde and the citizen participation really took 
off. 
JW: One of the evaluators, or a group of evaluators, who 
came to look at the Model cities program, found it to be 
different than any Model Cities program in any other city. And 
that difference was residence control. 
DB: That's right. Just read the research that Marshall 
Kaplan has done. 
JW: That's what I'm referring to. But Marshall Kaplan also 
pointed out that that was a weakness, the residence control. 
DB: Yeah. It was a weakness in some sense. But I think it 
was what made the Model cities program in Dayton work. The 
remnants of that Model cities program is that it's one of the few 
cities where, from a structural standpoint, Model Cities 
improvements are still present in terms of process. 
JW: You mean such as the Health Center, the Child's Drew 
Health Center; that's true. 
DB: Sure. And the housing coalitions that are there. 
JW: But the City Plan Board often complains that there were 
stuck with an enormous number of debts as a result of having the 
resident control, the satellite corporations didn't ... 
DB: The City Plan Board had a John Bircher as the director 
of the Plan Board at that time. Bob Flynn was a first-class 
asshole. He didn't want to get involved in any social programs. 
That was his demise. That was what made Kunde decide to pull the 
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planning staff into the manager's office so he could control that 
office. And with that Bob Flynn ultimately left, or he was going 
to be fired. Here's a guy who's a strong supporter of Bobby 
Jones College down in Virginia and sends checks to what's-his-
name down in Lynchburg and his kids went to school at Bobby 
Jones. He reeks of that conservative, anti-social change 
philosophy. You can see, too, that one of my styles as a person 
is that if you can't deal with them intellectually, you tear them 
apart philosophically. We did that successfully. 
JW: Well, you certainly were successful; there's no 
question about that. 
DB: It was fun. We had a great team at MVRPC. 
JW: The way the newspapers tell the story, your leaving the 
Miami Valley Regional Center was the result of enormous cuts that 
that office received, but the way you're talking now was that an 
opportunity in Washington opened up. That it was more an 
opportunity to go to a national level than it was ... 
DB: The money hadn't left. 
JW: ... hadn't been cut yet? 
DB: No, it hasn't been cut now. What has affected MVRPC 
was the director that followed me decided because of pressure 
from the Chamber of Commerce and some city managers to back away 
from social programs. They gave the whole block grant and 
housing program to Montgomery County. Montgomery County's got 
money running out of their ears. I mean that if he had kept the 
housing program and is just the same. Walk in the 
24 
office today and look at it. I mean it's like walking into a 
chamber of commerce office. 
JW: I visited their archives is all I've done. The 
archivist was very pleasant. 
DB: I love all of them. There are a lot of people still 
there that I employed. A lot of the key people are gone. They 
don't get involved in the criminal justice programs the same way 
that we did. The whole social agenda was basically shut. 
JW: You mentioned that you were instrumental, or at least 
you were a part of, that change in philosophy towards urban 
planning. I've been told that the Model Cities program, the 
demonstration, in fact, of 1966, represented that change in 
philosophy from land use to social planning. I guess I'm asking 
two questions there. One, does that 1966 act represent the 
change and how did you become involve? 
DB: It wasn't 1966, it was 1968. It wasn't passed, the 
Model cities Act, if I'm not mistaken it was legislated and 
passed right after Martin Luther King and Bob Kennedy were 
assasinated. In fact, the term "Demonstration Cities Act" was 
the original title of it. And there were those people who felt 
that if you demonstrated, you got money. So they changed the 
name to Model cities. Because they were wanting to create 
"model" cities. When I say that I think we played a role, we 
certainly played a role in the change of how planners begin to 
think of concept of advocacy planning. The housing, 
historically, we did a national research and literature reviews 
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when we began to do the housing plan because we were trying to 
figure out what is a housing plan; what should a housing plan be? 
And basically most planners up until that period felt that 
housing was a part of the private market place. That what you 
did is you did a lot of surveys, you dealt with zoning issues, 
you painted on the margin of subdivision regulations. But you 
didn't try to affect where growth occurred. I think we created a 
change there. Paul Davidoff, who was on the national board of 
AAIP, was probably one of the leaders from a national standpoint, 
for advocacy. My feeling consistently was, and in fact a part of 
the Model cities program in Dayton, MVRPC put staff people in 
every Model cities office in Dayton. We did, the city did. And 
my feeling was that what citizens lacked was access to 
bureaucracy. 
JW: As one of the premises of the plan, access to power. 
DB: And Joe Wine is the one, and Ron Gatton, and Jim Kunde, 
who basically turned their back on us and allowed us to put 
regional staff in those offices in the city. And we found 
ourselves fighting Bob Flynn and other people on data 
interpretation. 
JW: That must have been then when it was planned 
variations, when it was a city-wide Model Cities, rather than the 
demonstration project in the inner west. 
DB: That's right. 
JW: Although that was going on at the same time. 
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DB: There was a certain amount of Model Cities in the 
east, east Dayton, also about the same time the west thing was 
going on. West operated for about 18 months and then they kicked 
off an east one because the Appalacian whites were fussy; they 
said that it's not a color issue; it's a class issue. It's an 
economic issue. And they were right. 
JW: There was an original plan, I thought, before Scholars 
submitted their Model cities application that supposed to be a 
city-wide effort to beautify or enhance the city. 
DB: Yeah. But the legislaton at that time only allowed you 
to have 15 or 20% of the city designated as Model cities. So 
they had to decide where. 
JW: Right. 
DB: And the city of Dayton had long turned its back on west 
Dayton. If you looked at the park inventory, if you looked at 
the capital improvement investments, during Herb Sterick's 
tenure, when he was city manager, and Dayton was viewed as an 
ideal community because of the way it implemented plans. And 
they were implemented all right ... 
JW: It was a crescent shape. 
DB: It was a crescent shape and it avoided the problems in 
west Dayton. There are just books galore that if I had time I 
could pull off my shelf that cite the kind of changes that Dayton 
and MVRPC caused. We were resource people as staff. It was the 
commissioners who really had the guts that made the difference. 
They could very easily have said no. We began the housing plan, 
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initially we did the first six months work on it without approval 
of the commission. And without any money. I had squirreled away 
about a quarter of a million dollars by kind of raking stuff off 
and putting it in another accounts. And that's what allowed us 
to do that. But the first plan, we spent about 25 or 30,000 
dollars on the development of the first plan. 
JW: And, again, speaking of the problems which the plan ran 
into, one of the difficulties in the mid-70's, 1973 or 1974, was 
that the population declined and there wasn't as much of a need 
to build in the suburbs and housing that could be rehabilitated 
was in the city. So that seemed to preclude dispersal. Or at 
least work against it. 
DB: Yeah. The building permits, though, kept being issued 
in the suburbs. There was still a movement out. And that 
movement out is still continuing today. Those with means could 
certainly move. And the availability of the housing certainly 
precludes a lot of people within the center city of executing and 
obtaining jobs, the development of jobs has certainly exacerbated 
the problem. 
JW: I really want to thank you for spending this time with 
me. I'm sensitive about taking too much of your time. But I 
really do appreciate this. 
DB: Well, I'd be interested in seeing what the result of 
this is. 
JW: I'll be happy to try to send it to you. 
DB: Let me get a couple of xeroxes of these things ... 
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JW: We were mentioning that the way you appealed to the 
suburbanites was to satisfy most of their problems. 
DB: To try and identify what their concerns were, whether 
the be real or perceived and deal with those concerns; to the 
point where they could all be dealt with except the final one, 
which was they didn't like black people, or they didn't like poor 
people. And at that point they had to face the reality of their 
racism or their class prejudice and that was the kind of 
battleground that we loved because we could deal with that. 
JW: So in Chevy Chase you had lower density ... 
DB: We had lower density in all the projects, but 
specifically the first was Chevy Chase; lower density than what 
it was zoned for, construction style that matched the 
neighborhood and we tried to make sure that there were amenities 
so that the people who came were able to be like their neighbors. 
And I think that that has proven true. 
JW: So you really have a real faith in democracy here then? 
DB: I think that the whole plan was founded on democratic 
principles. We felt very strongly that the majority of people, 
once the myth of what a typical low amounted income person was, 
were dealt with, they would be accepted. And those people who 
wouldn't be willing to accept them, would be avoided. Once we 
were able to identify clearly a bigoted person, most of the 
audience and most citizens would back away from that argument 
because they didn't want to be associated with it. 
JW: Thank you again very much. 
